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P A R T I D I V I N E I N T E L L E C T
The first step out of the genuine despair, which every interpreter of Irenaeus knows, is a recognition of Irenaeus' criteria. Alongside his logical argument which pursues truth there is his perception of fitness. This governs the apparently ridiculous claim that there must be four Gospels because there are four winds and because living things are tetramorphous. With prophetic visions as the final xii Preface source of truth, aesthetic fitness governs exposition. Here the interpreter of Irenaeus needs a poet. I was fortunate to find Chris Wallace Crabbe's comic poem 'Why does a cauliflower so much resemble a brain?' and to discuss with him the way poetic association works. Prophetic imagery is born afresh in Irenaeus through poetic association. How argument and imagery fit together is an endless inquiry. Their presence as two criteria must be recognised in Irenaeus and the whole of Christian culture.
The other step for an interpreter is to identify the concepts, which govern his author's thought. For much of the twentieth century no one wrote a theology of Irenaeus. Many wrote on specific concepts of economy (divine plan) and recapitulation (summing-up of all things). These concepts do not explain, however, the immediacy of God whose glory is a living man. Following the useful rule that a thinker's ideas centre on the points where his interpreters disagree, the concept of participation emerged. Since participation is always participation of someone or something, the concept of the divine Intellect as the source of all goodness moved to the beginning of the analysis. Participation is only possible if God wills to share his goodness. The four concepts: divine Intellect, economy, recapitulation and participation govern the gospel, which Irenaeus declares. God and man are joined when God becomes what men are in order to bring them to be what he is. Economy and recapitulation join, as Irenaeus puts it, the end to the beginning, man to God. The four concepts are intelligible in succession: the divine Intellect plans the economy, which ends in recapitulation and the sharing of divine goodness. They must be kept together. The immediacy of God is known because God creates from nothing, never allows Adam to leave his hands, becomes man that man might share in God. If we ignore the first and last concepts (divine goodness and participation) we omit the point of the process, which is to join divine glory to human life. Economy and recapitulation lose point without their source (divine goodness) and end (participation).
To the logical exploration of these ideas Irenaeus adds his other criterion, an aesthetic of divine glory. The divine economy is a prolongation of God, which may be seen. Irenaeus is an empiricist whose vision of God is the source of life. This element of Irenaeus Preface xiii has constituted his appeal to Christians over the centuries. It may be noted in contrast to a modern writer whose language reflects many of the ideas of Irenaeus. T. S. Eliot speaks, as does Irenaeus, of the moment in which past and future are conquered and reconciled, and of the crowned knot of fire in which all is brought to a good end. Yet Eliot writes with the hostility of an Absolute Idealist to empiricism which is the folly of old men. Irenaeus is close to Hopkins who sees God's glory in the world.
How do we use the four concepts and the two criteria to combat the accusation of confusion against Irenaeus? First, we must identify the vocabulary which Irenaeus uses to express his concepts. We must learn his language. Because Irenaeus is drawing on different sources, we must show that his opinions are not confined to one part of his work. Secondly, vocabulary takes meaning within argument. Therefore we must trace his arguments which are of three kinds. There is straight logical argument as in the refutation of Gnosticism in Book 2. There is the accumulated imagery of lists of prophecy which prove the truth of the apostolic preaching. Finally there is the composite argument of Irenaeus where the logic leap-frogs through scripture which is its guarantee of truth. This is exemplified in the two arguments, which end in love of enemies as the essence of recapitulation. These different kinds of argument are to be expected from the two criteria of logic and aesthetics.
One point of possible confusion may be clarified. I have hesitantly (because of probable misunderstanding) pointed to the presence of a Platonic paradigm in Irenaeus. He explicitly opposes Platonism on fundamental points: the status of forms and the material world, the meaning of history and the nature of man. Yet willy-nilly he thinks in the framework of his time and shares with the opposing Platonic underworld an intellectual machinery which makes controversy and new thought possible.
Remarkably, the chief influence of Gnosticism on Irenaeus was that it forced him to take Athens seriously. Gnosticism had to be met near Plato. Reasoned argument had to guide a barrage of texts. As a result Gnosticism (theosophy) stimulated its opposite (philosophy) and exegesis to produce Christian theology. Argument and imagery presented to inquirers a better use of the Socratic tradition. Gnostics were strong on picture and myth but weak on argument. When we xiv Preface have seen this, we begin to understand the second century, that fertile period which formed Western thought.
Since my concern is to understand Irenaeus, his criteria and his concepts, I have taken the account of his Protean opponents at face value. By setting out the teachings to which he is opposed he has defined the indefinable Gnosticism in a way that seems no longer possible. Since the variety of groups called 'Gnostic' rivals the incoherence of contemporary Anglo-American Christianity, some scholars today challenge the usefulness of the term. Even the general assessment of Gnostics is uncertain. Once seen (by Irenaeus and Plotinus) as world-haters, many are now seen as world-lovers, who were concerned to lessen the tension between their religion and society. I have discussed these issues in an appendix; but they are marginal to my purpose. Fortunately, Irenaeus set out carefully the views, which he rejected; their importance for us is that they gave him a stimulus without which he might never have completed the first great synthesis of Christian thought. The exploration of that synthesis is my concern. His claim that the transcendence of divine love implies God's immediacy may be a rejection of the 'separate God' of Gnosticism; but it is much more besides. It is a profound interpretation of the Christian gospel.
Orbe's favoured epithet for Irenaeus was 'rich'. This prolixity has squeezed out many pages of secondary discussion and I cannot hope to indicate my debt to those who have written about him during the last two hundred years. What remains will demonstrate that Irenaeus not only said good things, but that he gave good reasons for saying these things. The general reader may bypass, on first reading, the multiplicity of references to the text, which the scholar needs in order to learn the language of Irenaeus, to prove that the four concepts are universal and to elucidate their meaning. Equally important is the analysis of argument, for it is here, not in the aphorisms, that the synthesis of Irenaeus is evident.
From conversations over the years with Jacques Fantino, E. P. Meijering and John Rist, each of whom read a first draft, and with Norbert Brox, Louis Doutreleau, Robert Grant, Christoph Markschies, Denis Minns, Antonio Orbe, Pierre Prigent, and Bernard Sesboüé, I have learnt more than I can say. The late André Benoit was my colleague in Strasbourg twenty years ago. 
